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for the court's decision.21 In another case,22 embodying the same issues
and similar facts, the court held against the state, saying that: "... in the
enactment of this statute the legislature did not have in mind the acquire-
ment of access rights . . . ." Legislative intent was recognized and ac-
knowledged by this court in that their legislature had previously failed
to pass a proposed bill 23 similar to our 1951 highway bill.
With regard to the issue in the Hedrick case, the 1957 General
Assembly has eliminated the problem of statutory construction by pass-
age of a new highway bill 24 authorizing the Commission to restrict
access. Yet the broader and more important problem still remains: has
the court changed its rule of long standing that eminent domain statutes
will be strictly construed?
BoYD B. MASSAGEE
Fair Labor Standards Act-Wage and Hour-Coverage of New
Construction
Plaintiff-workers were engaged in building a $37,000,000 causeway,
twenty-five miles long, across Lake Pontchartrain immediately north of
New Orleans. This was a new project designed to relieve traffic con-
gestion on old highways around the east and west shores of the lake.
It was physically separated from existing highways, but when completed,
it would be an integral part of the state and federal highway systems,
with four-lane approach roads connecting with east-west and north-
south U. S. highways. Plaintiffs were also engaged in building a field
plant at the job site, which, when completed, would house the casting
of huge concrete pillars and deck slabs which were to serve as the
base of the causeway. Plaintiffs brought an action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act' for penalties and overtime compensation. The
construction company defended on the ground that this was new con-
struction and that therefore the act was inapplicable to these operations.
21 MINN. STAT. ANx. § 161.03 Subd. 1 (West 1945). The Commissioner is
authorized "to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation . . . all necessary right
of way needed in laying out and constructing the trunk highway system . . ..
" State v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 33 Wash. 2d 638, 206 P. 2d 1028
(1949).
2 Id. at 645, 206 P. 2d at 1032.
24 N. C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 993. Section 5 of this law is as follows: "Acquisi-
tion of property and property rights. For the purposes of this Act, the Commission
may acquire private or public property and property rights for contolled-access
facilities and service or frontage roads, including rights of access, air, view and
light, by gift, devise, purchase, or condemnation in the same manner as now or
hereafter authorized by law to acquire such property or property rights in con-
nection with highways ....
IFair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 201-211 (1956).
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the employees were
"engaged in commerce" and applied the act.2
Whether "new construction" is covered by the FLSA has long been
a source of confusion. The act itself is silent. It simply provides that
an employee "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce ' 3 is covered by the act and is entitled to the minimum wage
and overtime compensation specified therein.4 The act defines the word
"produced" as ". . . manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other
manner worked on... ." "Fringe" employees are deemed to be covered
if their work is "closely related" or "directly essential" to production.0
Shortly after the passage of the FLSA, the Administrator expressed
the view that:
The employees of local construction contractors generally are not
engaged in interstate commerce and do not produce any goods
which are shipped or sold across state lines. Thus, it is our
opinion that the employees engaged in the original construction
of buildings are not generally within the scope of the Act, even if
the buildings when completed will be used to produce goods for
commerce.
7
The adoption of such a limitation of what is "in commerce" was a
reiteration of the "new construction" doctrine adopted long before the
enactment of the FLSA in Raymond v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R.8 In
that case, plaintiff-employee sued under the Federal Employee's Liability
Act for injuries sustained, as he alleged, "in commerce." When the
injury occurred, plaintiff was working on a new railroad tunnel which
was to serve, when completed, as a cut-off through which trains carrying
interstate commerce would be re-routed. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the tunnel was not "in commerce" until it was actually used for such
and denied recovery under the act.
Following the administrator's interpretation of the FLSA, the courts
adopted the new construction rule in cases arising under the FLSA.9
Thus, it was clear that the construction of a new plant was not "in
' Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F. 2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 26
U. S. L. WEEK 3117 (U. S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 232).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 7, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§ 207 (1956).
'Fair Labor Standards Act §§ 6-7, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U. S. C. §§ 206-207 (1956).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 3 (1), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 203 (i) (1956).
' Ibid. The 1949 amendment added "closely related" and "directly essential."
Previously, "fringe" employees were those "necessary" to production. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949 § 3 (b), 63 STAT. 911.
'WAGE & HouR INTRmPRETATrv BULLETIN No. 5, Dec. 2, 1938.
8 243 U. S. 43 (1917).
'Murphy v. Reed, 335 U. S. 865 (1948).
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commerce" although the plant, when completed, would produce goods
for interstate commerce. 10  In Koepfle v. Garavaglia," the plaintiff-
employee was employed in the construction of a new highway. He
contended that he was either "engaged in commerce," or in the "pro-
duction of goods for commerce." The court held that the highway
retained its local characte? until finished and denied recovery.
The confusion in this area of the law has centered around a well
established exception to the "new construction" idea: if the work was
deemed to be reconstruction, improvement or repair of an existing
facility of commerce, it was covered by the Act. Such work was so
closely related to interstate commerce as to be in practice and legal con-
templation a part of it.' 2
The line of demarcation between new construction and repair or re-
construction of an existing facility of commerce has not been an easy one
to draw. It has resulted in apparently conflicting decisions in the circuit
courts. 13 With the advent of a large volume of highway construction
enlarging a great network of national and state roads, the status of such
construction under the act has become increasingly uncertain.
Where the work is on an existing highway or related facility of
commerce, the courts have applied the "existing instrumentality" excep-
tion. Thus, in Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin,14 the first group of em-
ployees were engaged in repairing and maintaining interstate highways
and the second group in producing paving mixture at a place removed
from the site of the road work. In granting an injunction against viola-
tions of the act, the court held that the workers in the first group were
doing a service indispensable to commerce and were therefore "engaged
in commerce." Employees in the second group were deemed to be
producing goods for commerce because their work was inseparable from
reconstruction and repair of the existing facilities.'6
"0 Kelley v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 162 F. 2d 555 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Noonan
v. Fruco Constr. Co., 140 F. 2d 633 (8th Cir. 1943).11200 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1952). 4
1" Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 (1943); Moss v. Gillioz
Constr. Co., 206 F. 2d 819 (10th Cir. 1953); Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co.,
156 F. 2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946).
In the area of highway reconstruction and repair, the employee is most often
deemed to be "engaged in commerce" rather than in the "production of goods
for commerce." The cases do not recognize a clear distinction between the two
categories. Compare Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., supra, with Overstreet v.
North Shore Corp., supra. See Engelbrelsen v. E. J. Albrecht Co., 150 F. 2d
602 (7th Cir. 1945), where it was held that viaducts, bridges, etc., are not "goods"
within the meaning of the act. However, if the employee produces the "ingredi-
ents" for road repair, and it is found that the road is an existing instrumentality of
commerce, the employee is deemed to "produce goods for commerce." Alstate
Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13 (1953).
"3 Compare Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., supra note 12, with Moss v. Gillioz
Constr. Co., 206 F. 2d 819 (10th Cir. 1953).
14345 U. S. 13 (1953).
13 Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 (1943) (maintenance work on
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In Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co.,16 the employer was engaged in,
inter alia, the construction of a new conduit for a telephone company
and foundations for a new railroad signal tower. It had also done repair
work on highway and railroad bridges. Regarding the repair work, the
court repeated the rule that work on existing facilities of commerce is
"so vital to the functioning of all of the . . . instrumentalities of com-
merce as to be for practical purposes part of interstate commerce
itself."17 In holding that the new construction was also covered,
the court concluded that the "conduit and the signal tower, while not
reconstruction jobs were so closely allied, the first to the existing tele-
phone system and the second to the railroad . . .,"18 as to be "in com-
merce."
In Moss v. Gillioz Constr. Co.,'9 the plaintiff-employee was employed
in the construction of a new bridge across the Arkansas River. The
bridge, when finished, was to serve a main east-west highway and relieve
congestion over an existing bridge. The court held that this was new
construction not covered under the act.20 The difference between the
Moss and McCrady cases would appear to lie in the divergent views as
to what constitutes an existing facility.
This was the uncertain state of the law when the United States
Supreme Court decided the perplexing case of Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer
& Co.21  In that case, the employees were building a new lock on the
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway which would provide an alternate route for
boats traveling the waterway and would relieve congestion in other areas
of the waterway. The defendant argued that this was new construction
and in the same category as the tunnel being constructed in Raymond
v. Chicago M. St. P. R. R., the parent case of the "new construction"
doctrine. In allowing an injunction against violations of the act, the
a bridge across the intracoastal waterway) ; Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 U. S.
19 (1953). In most of the highway construction cases allowing recovery, the
courts have found the employees to be either engaged in commerce or in actually
producing goods for commerce. Therefore, it has not been necessary to determine
the coverage of "fringe" employees. See note 6 supra.10 156 F. 2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946).
17 Id. at 936.
8 Ibid. The court relied on Pederson v. J. F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 318 U. S.
740 (1943), where the employees were engaged in building new abutments for a
railroad bridge carrying interstate trains. It was held that the employees were
engaged in commerce.10206 F. 2d 819 (10th Cir. 1953).
10 "The line of demarcation between new construction . . . and repairs and
improvement bf existing facilities of commerce . . . becomes more vague and in-
distinct as we enter the twilight zone separating these two classifications. We
ultimately reach a point where it cannot be said with that finality or certainty of
conviction which is desirable that an activity falls within one or the other of 'these
two classifications." Id. at 822 (concurring opinion). Accord, Van Klavern v.
Killian-House Co., 210 F. 2d 510 (5th Cir. 1954).
1349 U. S. 427 (1955).
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Court pointed out that the Raymond case arose under the FELA and
stated that:
We are dealing with a different Act of another vintage-one that
has been given a liberal construction .... The question whether
an employee is engaged "in commerce" within the meaning of the
present Act is determined by practical considerations, not by tech-
nical conceptions.... The test is whether the work is so directly
and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or
facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part
of it, rather than isolated local activity.22
This language might be taken as a rejection of the new construction
idea. Had the court stopped there, the import of the decision might
have been quite clear. But the court then stated:
Repair of facilities of interstate commerce is activity "in com-
merce" within the .meaning of the Act .... And we think the
work of improving existing facilities of interstate commerce, in-
volved in the present case, falls in the same category. 23
The decision is susceptible to two interpretations. In the first place,
it can be interpreted as abolishing the new construction idea. The broad
language used by the Court and its reference to an act of "another
vintage" would seem to sustain this view. To support this argument
is the later case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo,24 a case arising under
the FELA, which held that a 1939 amendment to the FELA in effect
supplanted the Raymond decision. Thus, it would seem to follow, that
if the case which first adopted the new construction idea is overruled,
then the rule itself is abolished and should no longer be applied to cases
arising under the FLSA-an act of "another vintage." In referring to
the Vollmer case, the Court stated: "This Court recently rejected the
'new construction' doctrine in determining whether an employee is
'engaged in commerce' within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.' 25 Although this was dictum, it becomes significant when taken
with the rejection of the Raymond decision.
The Vollmer case may also be interpreted as merely enlarging the
scope of what is to be included within the meaning of "an existing
facility of commerce"; that a network of national and state highways will
now be regarded as an existing facility and therefore construction of new
highways or bridges is merely improvement of an existing facility. This
seems to be the view of the circuit courts which have attempted to in-
terpret the Vollmer case.
22 Id. at 429. 2 Ibid.
" 351 U. S. 493 (1956). 2Id. at 500.
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the principal case, the Fifth Circuit refused to say that Vollmer
had abolished the new construction doctrine, but did say that before
Vollmer there would be "some doubt" as to coverage because the cause-
way was physically removed from existing highways. The court stressed,
however, the importance of "practical considerations rather than tech-
nical conceptions" 26 in determining coverage under the act. Since the
work of the employees actually working on the causeway was "so di-
rectly and vitally related to the functioning of"2 7 a facility of commerce,
it was within the meaning of "engaged in commerce."
Regarding the workers building the field plant -which was to be used
to build concrete pillars and deck slabs used in the causeway, the court
held that they were also "engaged in commerce." The basis of the
holding was that the plant was built solely to facilitate the construction
of the causeway, and as a practical matter, the employees building the
plant were also building a causeway. The operation was an integral
part of the whole project. The court recognized, however, that the
mere fact that a new building is to be used for commerce when com-
pleted will not ordinarily be considered "in commerce" while being con-
structed.
In Chambers Constr. Co. v. Mitchell,28 the employees were con-
structing a new water line which was to replace an existing line. When
finished, it would furnish water for commerce purposes. The court held
that the project fell within the text expounded in the Vollmer case and
granted an injunction. In referring to the Vollmer case, the court
refused to say that it abolished the new construction rule but stated:
"In our opinion, the Vollmer decision infers that the 'new construction
rule' is not applicable to the repair or replacement of existing facilities.
This is not a change in the law."2 9 The case is factually indistinguish-
able from the Raymond case. Thus, it will be observed that the facf
situation which gave rise to the "new construction" doctrine, has now
become an exception to it.3 0
An analysis of the circuit court cases following Vollmer indicate a
", See note 22 supra.27 Ibid., and Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc.,. 241 F. 2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1957).
'233 F. 2d 717 (8th Cir. 1956).
'Id. at 721; 7 LABOR LAw JOURNAL 514 (1956). In Mitchell v. Hodges Con-
tracting Co., 238 F. 2d 380 (5th Cir. 1956), the employees were engaged in build-
ing a new plant which would house a carpeting business when completed. The
court held that this was new construction, not within the act. In another aspect
of the case, employees were engaged in constructing a new building which was to
house a new television station and replace an existing radio station a mile away.
The court held that the work was covered on the ground that it was an improve-
ment of an existing facility (radio station). The plaintiff argued that the work
should be covered, independent of the radio station, since the building was to house
a new television station which would be addition to -an existing national television
network. The court refused to pass on this question.
'0 7 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 514 (1956).
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hesitancy to say that Vollmer abolished the "new construction" doctrine
as the Supreme Court said it did in the Gileo case. However, the recent
emphasis on "practical considerations" would lead to the conclusion that
the new construction rule has been affected. Specifically, in the field of
construction, the courts seem willing to label such things as existing na-
tional highway or railroad systems "facilities of commerce" and there-
fore, construction of additional roads or bridges, even though "new," are
additions or improvements of an existing facility. This is but a broad-
ening of the exception to the new construction rule and serves to
substantially erode the rule itself.
Developments in this area have done little to clarify the status of
the construction of a new building which is to be used to produce
goods for commerce when completed. If the building is to serve as a
supplementary part of an existing assembly line system of production, it
would seem that the construction is covered, even though the new plant
is physically removed from other plants in the operation. This is on
the theory that in such case, the new building is but an improvement of
an existing facility. However, if the building is to house a completely
new business, it would seem that its construction is not covered, even
though it will produce goods for commerce when completed. 3 '
Shortly after the Chambers decision, the Administrator issued a new
interpretative bulletin.3 2 He now takes the view that:
Coverage of any construction work depends upon how closely
integrated it is with, and how essential it is to the functioning of,
existing covered facilities. Neither the mere fact that the con-
struction is "new construction" nor the fact that it is physically
separated from an existing covered plant, is determinative.83
However, construction of a new factory building to be used in com-
merce when completed, unless integrated with an existing facility, "will
not ordinarily be considered covered. '34  This appears to affirm the
views of the circuit courts. While the administrator's interpretations
do not have the effect of law they are entitled to weight8 5 The question
of whether the "new construction" doctrine is in fact abolished or still
hangs on by a weakening thread will await a more positive statement
from the United States Supreme Court.
BILLY F. MAREADY
3' Mitchell v. Hodges Contracting Co., 238 F. 2d 380 (5th Cir. 1956).
8229 C. F. R. §§ 776.2Z-776.30 (1956).
8 29 C. F. R. § 776.26 (1956).
n'29 C. F. R. § 776.27(c) (1956).
t Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946) ; U. S. v. Amer-
icin Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U. S. 534 (1940).
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